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Power and temporal commitment preference: An investigation in 
Portugal, Turkey, and the United States 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The current research explores the impact of power on temporal commitment 
preference (an individual’s preference for shorter or longer time durations 
for agreements in decision making situations) across three countries: 
Portugal, Turkey, and the United States. A pilot study (N = 356) established 
cultural differences in uncertainty avoidance, which was expected to impact 
choices and behaviors involving power and temporality. The main study (N 
= 433) investigated the relationship between power and temporal 
commitment preference. Across all countries, high power individuals 
preferred shorter temporal commitments than low power individuals. In 
addition, the U.S. participants preferred longer temporal commitments than 
either the Portuguese or Turkish participants. We argue that differences in 
uncertainty avoidance help explain some of the differences in individuals’ 
temporal commitment preferences across diverse cultural settings. 
Implications for practice and future directions are also discussed.   
 
 
Keywords: Power, Time, National culture, Uncertainty avoidance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Power bestows on its holder the capacity to impose his or her will on 
others, to put pressure on others to do things that help the powerful 
achieve their objectives (Boulding, 1989; Pfeffer, 1992). Individuals with 
power control resources and possess skills that are important in 
organizations, and, consequently, can push for their own objectives, 
influence plans, determine strategies, and shape outcomes for others 
(Kipnis, 1976; Ng, 1980). Thus, in organizations, those with power are 
decision drivers who have the ability to get things done (Mintzberg, 1983). 
As a result, identifying the power relationship between parties in decision 
making situations is important because a priori assessments of who has or 
lacks power may help explain the characteristics of decisions (Kim, Pinkley, 
& Fragale, 2005).  
Among the conditions that the powerful can often impose on others are 
the temporal characteristics of decisions. In the current investigation, we 
explore one such temporal characteristic: the time duration over which a 
policy, strategy, agreement, or contract will be binding. Individuals’ 
preferences for a certain time duration over which an agreement will remain 
in place, referred here as temporal commitment preferences, can have 
important consequences for organizations, locking decision makers into or 
out of favorable or unfavorable decisions and potentially affecting broader 
outcomes such as organizational effectiveness. Although there has been a 
flurry of research on power and on time in decision-making, the impact of 
power on temporal commitment preference has not been established.   
Temporal choices are also likely to be influenced by the cultural 
environment that individuals are embedded in. However, little is known 
regarding the effect of culture on temporality in decision making situations 
(Armagan, Ferreira, Bonner, & Okhuysen, 2006). Culture serves as a lens to 
understand, interpret, and navigate the world (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991) and an important driver of values (what is considered important) and 
means (how to go about fulfilling what is important). In essence, culture 
constrains, directs, and steers thought and behavior. Although cultures vary 
on a number of important dimensions, we believe that as an underlying 
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cultural value, uncertainty avoidance (Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Hofstede, 
1980a) is a particularly potent predictor of temporal preferences in decision 
making.  
The present research investigates the influence of power on temporal 
commitment preference across three separate national cultures: Portugal, 
Turkey, and the U.S. We selected these three national cultures because 
they belong to distinct cultural clusters: Portugal to the Latin Europe 
cluster, Turkey to the Arabic cluster, and the U.S. to the Anglo cluster (see 
Ashkanasy, Trevor-Roberts, & Earnshaw, 2002; Jesuino, 2002; Kabasakal & 
Bodur, 2002). We examined the effects of power and national culture on 
temporal commitment preference in a negotiation because it represents the 
type of collective mixed-motive decision making that occurs at all levels and 
types of organizations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). We first present a 
pilot study to establish cross-cultural differences in uncertainty avoidance. 
Then, we present our main study which explores the relationship between 
power, national culture, and temporal commitment preference.  
POWER 
Power is typically defined as asymmetric control over valuable 
resources and outcomes within a specific situation and set of social relations 
(Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; 
Magee & Galinsky, in press; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). This definition of 
power implicitly involves both control over and independence from others in 
obtaining important outcomes (Emerson, 1962). As a mechanism of control 
and influence, power often involves putting pressure on others, driving 
others to do the things that will help the powerful accomplish their own 
objectives (Boulding, 1989; Pfeffer, 1992). Control over resources, and 
therefore having power, often comes from a structural position, or the role 
an individual occupies in a formal hierarchy (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; 
Kipnis, 1976; Mintzberg, 1983; Ng, 1980). In addition, in decision-making 
contexts such as negotiation, individuals have power based on the quality of 
alternatives available to them, referred to as the Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley, Neale & 
Bennett, 1994). In this paper, we instantiate power in two ways: 
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alternatives to an agreement (strong vs. weak) in a negotiation and formal 
role (management representative vs. labor union representative).  
Power and Temporal Commitment Preference 
To understand the impact of power on temporal commitment 
preference, a useful lens is the approach/inhibition theory of power 
proposed by Keltner et al. (2003). According to this theory, high power is 
related to increased rewards and freedom, and therefore high power tends 
to activate approach-related tendencies. Conversely, low power is related to 
increased threat, punishment, and social constraint and therefore low power 
activates inhibition-related tendencies. Consequently, those with power 
experience more positive emotion (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), are more 
optimistic (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), take more risks (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006), and are more action-oriented (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003).   
As a result of approach-related tendencies, high power individuals are 
likely to feel more optimistic and confident about improving current benefits 
in future exchanges such as negotiations than low power individuals. 
Therefore, compared to those who lack power, the powerful may be more 
likely to prefer agreements with shorter time commitments because these 
agreements afford the opportunity to improve one’s situation sooner rather 
than later. On the other hand, since powerlessness has been linked to 
negative affect, inhibition, and perceiving the environment as more 
threatening (Keltner et al., 2003), we expect that individuals in low power 
situations prefer to lock into agreements for longer time horizons to benefit 
from the security inherent in a longer agreement. Because power often 
emerges from the strength of one’s alternatives in negotiations, having a 
strong alternative to a current negotiation will lead individuals to prefer a 
relatively short time commitment.  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who posses power in a negotiation (e.g., 
have a strong BATNA) will prefer shorter temporal commitments than 
those who lack power (e.g., have a weak BATNA). 
Although having a strong or weak BATNA can determine individuals’ 
power, the power that individuals possess can also accrue from the 
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structural position (hierarchy) of the individual (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; 
Kipnis, 1976; Mintzberg, 1983; Ng, 1980). Thus, we expect that those who 
perceive themselves as occupying more powerful roles in organizations will 
prefer shorter temporal commitments than those who perceive themselves 
as occupying less powerful positions. In a labor negotiation setting, the one 
we use for the scenarios of the current research, an individual representing 
management may be likely to perceive him or herself as possessing more 
power than an individual representing the labor union, since the former 
represents the employer and the latter represents the employees. This is 
consistent with the notion that the roles occupied by negotiators may 
represent differential sources of power; for example, previous research 
suggested that, in job negotiations, recruiters possess more power and are 
more likely to have an intention to make the first offer than candidates 
(Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Accordingly, we expect that 
management representatives will prefer shorter temporal commitments 
than labor union representatives. Thus, we formally hypothesize a 
difference across roles in a labor negotiation setting. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals in high-power roles (e.g., management 
representative) will prefer shorter temporal commitments than those in 
low-power roles (e.g., labor union representative).    
Uncertainty Avoidance and Temporal Commitment Preference 
In addition to the power they possess, individuals’ temporal 
commitment preferences may also depend on the amount of uncertainty 
they are willing to shoulder. One relevant stream of evidence that provides 
a link between time and uncertainty is the research on delays in decision 
outcomes (e.g., Jones & Johnson, 1973; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Prelec 
& Loewenstein, 1991; Shelley, 1994). Delays in the realization of decision 
outcomes (i.e., time delays) involve uncertainty and consequently more 
risk. Larger delays naturally carry more uncertainty because unexpected 
events may occur in the meantime (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995). One way in 
which individuals can respond to and reduce the uncertainty of future 
outcomes is by creating contractual agreements, which provide stability for 
the parties to an agreement. When a contract is binding for a longer period, 
the uncertainty is lessened for a longer period of time.  
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One of the dimensions of culture that distinguish individuals’ attitude 
towards ambiguity is uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which 
people in a given culture feel threatened by uncertain and ambiguous 
situations and seek to avoid them (Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Hofstede 
1980b). Cultures low in uncertainty avoidance are open to change, have a 
propensity to take risks, and tend to accept varying situational demands 
(Hofstede, 1980a; House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman, Javidan, & 
GLOBE associates, 1999). Cultures high in uncertainty avoidance tend to 
resist change as it threatens stability and brings about uncertainty (Harzing 
& Hofstede, 1996; Steensma, Marino, & Dickson, 2000). 
Uncertainty avoidance is generally associated with a preference for 
maintaining the status quo and committing to the present situation. For 
example, Hofstede (1980b) asserted that since individuals high on 
uncertainty avoidance seek greater career stability, prefer formal rules, and 
avoid risk, they stay longer in their jobs and have less intention to leave 
their organizations. In addition, uncertainty avoidance has been linked to 
increased planning activity (Hofstede, 2001) and the length of planning time 
horizon (Haiss, 1990). For instance, cultures that are low on uncertainty 
avoidance tend to prefer more flexible, short-term strategic planning 
processes (Brock, Barry, & Thomas, 2000). Consistent with the notion that 
high levels of uncertainty avoidance is associated with maintaining the 
status quo to a larger degree, increased planning activity (Hofstede, 2001), 
and long-term planning processes (Brock et al., 2000), we suggest that 
members of cultures higher on uncertainty avoidance will prefer to commit 
to longer agreements to minimize the uncertainty of the future.  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals in cultures higher in uncertainty avoidance 
will prefer longer temporal commitments than individuals in cultures 
lower in uncertainty avoidance.  
Power, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Temporal Commitment 
Preference 
The impact of power, whether stemming from a strong alternative to a 
situation or from a structural role, on temporal commitment preference is 
likely to be affected by the cultural context in which individuals are 
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embedded in. Although power stemming from a situation (such as having a 
strong BATNA) and role (such as occupying a powerful position in the 
hierarchy) should be negatively related to temporal commitment preference 
(as spelled out in Hypotheses 1 and 2), we expect these relationships to be 
stronger for individuals embedded in cultures lower on uncertainty 
avoidance since these individuals tend to be more accepting of varying 
situational demands (Hofstede, 1980a; House et al. 1999). In contrast, in 
those cultures higher on uncertainty avoidance, individuals’ desire for longer 
contracts may override any situation variability caused by differences in 
power.  
 Hypothesis 4: National culture will moderate the relationship 
between power and temporal commitment preference, such that the 
difference between high and low power on length of temporal 
commitments will be stronger in lower uncertainty avoidance cultures 
than in higher uncertainty avoidance cultures. 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
A pilot study was conducted to establish whether there were 
differences on uncertainty avoidance across Portugal, Turkey, and the U.S. 
Although such measurement has taken place before (e.g., Hofstede, 1980a; 
House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004), our desire was to 
establish these differences in the specific setting for our research, the 
undergraduate business classroom. Subsequently, we conducted the main 
study to test our hypotheses, examining the effect of power and national 
culture on temporal commitment preference. 
Pilot Study 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
Three hundred and sixty-five business undergraduate students 
majoring in business administration participated in this study. These 
students were enrolled in universities in Portugal (N= 154), Turkey (N= 
117), and the U.S. (N= 85). To assess cultural differences across the three 
countries, we used Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) five-item uncertainty 
avoidance scale, anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) 
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(e.g., Clugston, Howell & Dorfman, 2000; Dorfman & Howell, 1988). A 
sample item asked respondents to report the extent to which they believed 
“it is important to have job requirements and instructions spelled out in 
detail so that employees always know what they are expected to do.” The 
questionnaire that included the scale was originally written in English and 
then was translated to and back-translated from Portuguese and Turkish by 
two bilingual members of the research team.  
RESULTS 
We subjected the responses to principal factor analysis to establish the 
adequacy of the scale. Four items loaded on one factor, with a fifth loading 
poorly (.38). This item was excluded from subsequent analysis. We 
averaged the responses of the remaining four items to create an uncertainty 
avoidance score (alpha = .74). Using ANOVA we found a significant 
difference on uncertainty avoidance across countries, F(2,355) = 4.03, p < 
.05. The Turks (M = 5.53, SD = .93) were the least uncertainty avoidant 
whereas the U.S. participants were the most uncertainty avoidant (M = 
5.87, SD = .93). The score for the Portuguese was in between the U.S. 
participants and the Turks (M = 5.74, SD = .76). The Portugal and Turkey 
samples differed significantly (t(353) = 1.98, p < .05), as did the Turkey 
and the U.S. (t(353) = 2.74, p < .01). There was no statistical difference 
between Portugal and the U.S. (t(353) = -1.10, n.s.). Having established a 
baseline difference in uncertainty avoidance across the three cultures of 
interest, we proceeded with our main study.  
Main Study 
Method 
Participants and Design 
433 undergraduate business students enrolled in universities in 
Portugal (N = 190, mean age = 25.3 (sd. = 4.84), 139 women (74%)), 
Turkey (N = 103, mean age = 21.57 (sd = 1.48), 40 women (39%)), and 
the U.S. (N = 140, mean age = 23.5 (sd = 2.27), 47 women (34%)) 
participated in this experiment. These students were a separate sample of 
participants from those who participated in the pilot study. The design was 
a 2 (Power: high vs. low) x 2 (Role: management vs. labor union 
12 
   
representative) x 3 (Country: Portugal, Turkey, U.S.) between-subjects 
design.   
Materials and Procedure 
This study involved preparation for a labor negotiation between a 
management and a labor union representative. We selected a labor 
negotiation scenario because it provides a setting that could be understood 
by all participants: in all three national cultures, labor unions play an 
important role in conversations about business, and thus our subjects would 
be expected to have some familiarity with the issues presented. The 
materials were originally written in English and then translated into 
Portuguese and Turkish by two native speaking members of the research 
team. Each translation was discussed with another bilingual speaker and 
inconsistencies were resolved. The materials were then back-translated 
from Portuguese and Turkish by two bilingual members of the research 
team. Participants in all countries were asked to assume the role of a 
management or of a labor union representative of a medium-sized firm with 
a unionized workforce. The negotiation involved a contract between the 
labor union and management that had just expired and thus bargaining for 
a new contract was about to begin. In the materials, participants were told 
that they had multiple issues to negotiate on (e.g. salary, bonuses, sick 
leave, vacation time, medical insurance, and the length of the contract).  
Manipulations  
Role was manipulated in the materials by assigning participants to 
either represent management or the labor union. Power was manipulated by 
informing participants about the strength of their alternatives. Specifically, 
half of the participants read that the pool of potential employees had 
decreased making it difficult for managers to hire new employees if no 
agreement was reached with the union representative (management low 
power) but making finding alternative jobs easy for workers (labor high 
power). Half of the participants read that the pool of potential employees 
had increased making it easy for managers to hire new employees 
(management high power) but making finding alternative jobs difficult for 
workers (labor low power). This manipulation uses a BATNA to manipulate 
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power in a negotiation setting (Pinkley et al., 1994, Magee et al., 2007). If 
the negotiator has an attractive BATNA, then he or she is less dependent on 
the outcome of the particular negotiation because he or she can do well 
elsewhere (Sondak & Bazerman, 1991). Power was coded as high power (1) 
and low power (0). Role was coded as management representative (1) or 
labor union representative (0). Country was coded for each of the three 
countries, as Portugal (1), Turkey (2), and the U.S. (3).  
Measure 
Our main dependent measure was the preferred contract length which 
reflected participants’ temporal commitment preferences. We asked 
participants their preference for the duration of the contract on a scale from 
one year to seven years.  
Manipulation Check 
As a manipulation check, we asked participants who they thought had 
more power in this negotiation: management or the labor union on a 1 to 7 
scale (1= management has more power, 4 = management and labor union 
have equal power, 7= labor union has more power). These were recorded 
on a 1 (management/labor union has less power) to 7 (management/labor 
union has more power) scale to capture participants’ perceived power.  
RESULTS 
Manipulation check. We submitted the manipulation check to a 2 
(Power: high vs. low) x 2 (Role: management vs. labor union 
representative) between-subjects ANOVA. The main effect of power was 
significant (F(1,433) = 165.59, p < .01). In particular, high power 
participants reported that their group had more power (M = 5.08, SD = 
1.47) and the low power participants recognized they were in a less 
powerful situation (M = 3.30, SD = 1.47). Because we predicted that 
participants in the management and labor roles would perceive themselves 
as having more or less power on the basis of their role, we also tested for 
this effect, which was also significant (F(1,433) = 14.20, p < .01), with 
management representatives perceiving they had more power (M = 4.43, 
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SD = 1.70) than labor union representatives (M = 3.95, SD = 1.71). The 
interaction between power and role was not significant (F(1,433) = .01, ns). 
Hypotheses tests. To test our hypotheses, we submitted contract 
length to a 2 (Power: high vs. low) x 2 (Role: management vs. labor union 
representative) x 3 (Country: Portugal, Turkey, U.S.) between-subjects 
ANOVA. Hypothesis 1 predicted that power stemming from BATNA would 
produce a shorter temporal commitment preference. The results of the 
analysis of variance showed a significant effect for power, F(1, 433) = 6.24, 
p = .013. High power participants preferred a shorter temporal commitment 
(M = 3.07, SD = 1.73) than low power participants (M = 3.42, SD = 1.70), 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 suggested that the manager role 
would prefer a shorter temporal commitment preference than the union 
role. The role condition (i.e., individual’s role as a management or as a 
labor union representative) had a significant effect on contract length, F(1, 
433) = 9.56, p = .002, where management representatives preferred a 
shorter contract length (M = 3.0, SD = 1.70) than did labor union 
representatives (M = 3.48, SD = 1.70). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was also 
supported.   
Hypothesis 3 predicted that individuals in higher uncertainty avoidance 
cultures would prefer longer temporal commitments than individuals in 
cultures low in uncertainty avoidance. We found a significant effect for 
country, F(2, 433) = 15.76, p = .00. In particular, participants in the U.S. 
(M = 3.88, SD = 1.70) preferred longer temporal commitments (i.e., longer 
contract length) than the Turkish participants (M = 2.99, SD = 1.90), who 
preferred longer temporal commitments than the Portuguese (M = 2.92, SD 
= 1.50). The U.S. participants preferred longer contracts lengths than the 
Turkish (t(430) = 4.11, p = .00) and the Portuguese participants (t(430) = 
5.20, p = .00). However, there was no significant difference between 
Portuguese and Turkish participants (t(430) = -0.37, ns). The mean 
contract lengths across the three countries are shown in the Figure. The 
finding that the U.S. participants prefer longer temporal commitments than 
the Turkish participants is consistent with the finding from the pilot study 
showing that the U.S. participants score higher on uncertainty avoidance 
than the Turkish participants. However, even though we found no 
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differences between the U.S. and Portugal on uncertainty avoidance in the 
pilot study, the U.S. participants preferred longer contracts than the 
Portuguese. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported for the U.S. and 
Turkey, but not for Portugal.  
Hypothesis 4 suggested that national culture moderates the 
relationship between power, stemming from BATNA or role, and temporal 
commitment preference. However, national culture did not moderate the 
relationship between power from BATNA and temporal commitment 
preference (F(2, 433) = 1.71, ns) or between power from role and temporal 
commitment preference (F(2, 433) = .66, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was 
not supported.  
DISCUSSION 
The current research is the first to examine the relationship between 
power and temporal commitment preference, with the results generally 
supporting our predictions. Power, both defined in terms of strength of 
alternatives and role (management vs. union representative) led 
negotiators to prefer a shorter contract length. Thus, power led to a 
preference for shorter time commitments. In addition, based on cross-
national differences in uncertainty avoidance, negotiators in the U.S., which 
scored higher on uncertainty avoidance than Turkey, preferred longer 
contract lengths than those in Turkey (and Portugal). However, power and 
nationality did not interact. Thus, the effect of power on time commitment 
preferences was constant across countries.  
The current research provides a number of important contributions to 
the existing literature. Our first contribution is to the literature on power. 
Our findings highlight the importance of power by showing how those with 
power, whether their power comes from having a strong alternative or from 
occupying a powerful role, exhibit a preference for shorter time horizons in 
their agreements. This finding is consistent with the approach/inhibition 
theory of power, which suggests that when individuals are in positions of 
power they psychologically experience increased rewards and freedom, 
whereas those without power see the environment as more threatening and 
less rewarding (Keltner et al., 2003). We also contribute to the literature on 
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power by examining the impact of power in multiple cultural settings 
simultaneously. Although theory and research on power has grown over the 
years (Keltner et al., 2003), the study of power has mostly focused on the 
U.S.; therefore, it is increasingly important to examine the role of power in 
diverse cultural settings to test the robustness of current theories while also 
opening up possible avenues for new research.  
It is important to note that, in addition to power and national culture, a 
number of other factors may also play a role in explaining individuals’ 
temporal commitment preferences, including previous relationship history, 
expectations of change in power relationship in the future, and desire to 
build a relationship with the other party. While we singled out the effects of 
power and national culture on temporal commitment preference, we 
encourage future research to examine other factors that are likely to 
influence individuals’ temporal commitment preferences. Examining a full 
range of factors in addition to the ones presented in the current research 
can lead to a development of a complete model of temporal preferences in 
decision making.  
Another contribution of this work is to the literature on cross-cultural 
organizational behavior given our measurement of a cultural attribute (i.e., 
uncertainty avoidance) in specific subcultures of interest (i.e., business 
students). Our work identifies a discrepancy between current and previous 
findings (i.e., see Ashkanasy et al., 2002, Jesuino, 2002, and Kabasakal & 
Bodur, 2002 for findings of project GLOBE; Hofstede, 1980a) vis-à-vis 
cultural values of the Portuguese, Americans, and the Turks. Specifically, 
some of our measures of these values, and the relative ordering across the 
three countries on those constructs, are different from earlier research1. 
Although it would be tempting to dismiss such a discrepancy as a mere 
 
1 In summary form, the discrepancy is as follows. On uncertainty avoidance, we 
found that the U.S. participants scored higher than the Turkish participants but the 
same as the Portuguese participants, who scored higher than the Turkish 
participants. On the other hand, the findings of project GLOBE rated Turkey higher 
on uncertainty avoidance than Portugal, which was rated higher than the U.S. (see 
Ashkanasy et al., 2002, Jesuino, 2002 and Kabasakal & Bodur, 2002 for “should be” 
findings of project GLOBE). In contrast, Hofstede’s (1980a) work rated Portugal as 
more uncertainty avoidant than Turkey. It is important to note that the 
comparisons across countries reported by project Globe (House et al., 2004) and 
Hofstede (1980a) are mean value comparisons rather than statistical ones. 
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empirical error, we believe that our work instead points to the importance of 
measuring cultural values in the specific population or sub-population of 
interest rather than readily assuming the immediate relevance of previous 
research findings of cultural values. Therefore, we encourage researchers to 
study the cultural characteristics of sub-cultures when the theoretical 
and/or empirical approach they take demands them to do so.  
The work we present here also contributes to the literature on decision 
making. By identifying individuals’ temporal preferences as one facet of the 
decision making process, we expand on the range of phenomena at the 
intersection of decision making and time (Albert, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Earlier research has considered, for example, the idea that decisions have a 
“period of maturation,” during which the effects of a given choice become 
evident (Albert, 1995). However, the notion that periods during which a 
decision is relevant can be fixed as an a priori characteristic in the decision 
making process has received less attention. Agreements bind individuals to 
specific outcomes for a period of time. Thus, individuals’ preferences for 
longer or shorter temporal durations can have significant implications for 
organizations by binding organizations to beneficial or costly decisions. 
Given that our results show that differences in power can affect preferences 
for longer and shorter periods for a decision, this is an area that deserves 
further attention. 
This paper contributes to the literature on time by introducing the 
notion of temporal commitment preference and examining it as a dependent 
variable. Often, time and temporal characteristics are treated as 
independent variables (for instance, through the use of deadlines), and 
although researchers have emphasized their influence, they have largely 
ignored their role as products of human activity (e.g., Benson & Beach, 
1996; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Moore, 2004; Mosterd & Rutte, 2000; 
Okhuysen, Galinksy, & Uptigrove, 2003; Stuhlmacher & Champagne, 2000). 
However, considering temporal characteristics from multiple angles allows 
for a more complete understanding of their role in understanding human 
behavior. Thus, we encourage future research to consider time and 
temporal characteristics as outcomes of interest rather than only as 
predictors of other phenomena. 
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We also contribute to the literature on time by incorporating national 
culture into our examination of temporal phenomena. This is critical as 
earlier research has emphasized that time is culturally bound (Armagan et 
al., 2006; Foster 1992; Hall, 1959, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1990). For example, 
our results showed that individuals in the U.S. preferred longer temporal 
commitments on agreements than individuals in Turkey. This result is 
consistent with higher uncertainty avoidance scores for the U.S. than for 
Turkey in the pilot study. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Portuguese exhibited 
a preference for shorter temporal commitments than individuals in the U.S. 
and Turkey even though the Portuguese did not differ in uncertainty 
avoidance from individuals in the U.S. and were more uncertainty avoidant 
than the Turks. This finding suggests that uncertainty avoidance may not 
fully capture underlying differences in temporal preferences across cultures. 
Instead, other national environment factors may operate simultaneously 
during decision making. These factors include elements such as economy 
(e.g., economic stability, unemployment rate), legal systems (e.g., labor 
protection laws), and culture (e.g., long term orientation, future orientation) 
(Armagan et al., 2006). Together with our findings, future research may 
benefit from an understanding of the influence of these factors on 
individuals’ temporal preferences in decision making situations.   
With regards to implications for practice, our results suggest that 
identifying power differences, especially in collective decision making 
contexts like negotiation, may benefit parties by allowing them to anticipate 
temporal preferences of their opponents and to take precautions to mitigate 
potential conflict. For the powerless, one such precaution may be to include 
the length of the agreement or contract as an item in the negotiation, 
making it an explicit part of the decision process. This can ensure that 
parties discuss the length of the agreement and strike a deal on this issue 
rather than the powerless simply agreeing to the terms of the powerful. 
Additionally, our work suggests that it is important for negotiators to 
identify cultural differences when dealing with negotiators from other 
countries since these differences may bear on parties’ temporal preferences. 
For example, an Anglo cluster negotiator, such as a U.S. negotiator, may be 
likely to prefer longer agreements than an Arabic cluster negotiator, such as 
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a Turkish negotiator, who may be likely to prefer longer agreements than a 
Latin Europe cluster negotiator such as a Portuguese negotiator. Bringing 
length of agreement into the negotiation as an explicit item may be helpful 
in these instances as well.  
CONCLUSION 
Across three cultural contexts, we established that power and temporal 
preferences are closely related. Power, as a basic force in social 
relationships (Fiske, 1993), led negotiators to prefer shorter time 
commitments on agreements. Thus, it is not surprising that several decades 
ago, Russell (1938) observed that “the fundamental concept in social 
science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental 
concept in physics” (p. 10). It is our hope that this article will motivate 
future research on the impact of power on time preferences both in intra- 
and inter-cultural contexts. 
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Figure. Mean contract length, by power and role conditions, across 
countries (Main Study). 
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